Artikel

Corporate Investment, Asymmetric Information and Agency Costs in the UK

This paper investigates whether investment spending of firms is sensitive to the availability of internal funds. Imperfect capital markets create a hierarchy for the different sources of funds such that investment and financial decisions are not independent. The relation between corporate investment and free cash flow is investigated using the Bond and Meghir (1994a) Euler-equation model for a panel of 240 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange over a 6-year period. This method allows for a direct test of the first-order condition of an intertemporal maximisation problem. It does not require the use of Tobin's q, which is subject to mis-measurement problems.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung ; ISSN: 1861-1559 ; Volume: 70 ; Year: 2001 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 248-260 ; Berlin: Duncker & Humblot

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Investition
Investitionsentscheidung
Eigentümerstruktur
Corporate Governance
Asymmetrische Information
Großbritannien

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Goergen, Marc
Renneboog, Luc
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Duncker & Humblot
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2001

DOI
doi:10.3790/vjh.70.2.248
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Goergen, Marc
  • Renneboog, Luc
  • Duncker & Humblot

Time of origin

  • 2001

Other Objects (12)