Artikel
Local agency costs of political centralization
We analyze a model of moral hazard in local public services which could be efficiently managed by officials under local democratic accountability, but not by officials who are appointed by the ruler of a centralized autocracy. The ruler might prefer to retain an official who diverted resources from public services but contributed part to benefit the ruler. The autocratic ruler would value better public services only when residents reduce taxable investments which become unprofitable without good public services. For local government to benefit local residents, they must have some decentralized power to punish an official who serves them badly even while serving the ruler well
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 16 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 425-448 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Public Goods
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
- Subject
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Local public goods
moral hazard
decentralized democracy
centralized autocracy
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Myerson, Roger B.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
-
New Haven, CT
- (when)
-
2021
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE3763
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Myerson, Roger B.
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2021
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