Arbeitspapier
When do small countries win tax wars?
The paper analyzes the conditions under which the smaller of two otherwise identical countries prefers the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium to a situation of fully harmonized tax rates. A standard two-country model of capital tax competition is extended by allowing for transaction costs, additional countries, and additional tax instruments. The effects of introducing either mobility costs or a wage tax instrument are theoretically ambiguous because they lower both the costs and the benefits of non-cooperation from the perspective of the small country. Numerical simulations indicate, however, that for a wide range of parameter values all model extensions considered reduce the possibility that the small country gains from tax competition.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 304
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Economic Integration
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Eggert, Wolfgang
Haufler, Andreas
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
- (where)
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Konstanz
- (when)
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1996
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Eggert, Wolfgang
- Haufler, Andreas
- Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 1996
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