Rating opaque borrowers : why are unsolicited ratings lower?

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Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Working paper series / Frankfurt School of Finance & Management ; No. 133

Schlagwort
Industrieobligation
Kreditwürdigkeit
Systematischer Fehler
Unvollkommene Information
:z Geschichte 1996-2006

Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wo)
Frankfurt, M.
(wer)
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
(wann)
2009
Urheber
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009110909
Rechteinformation
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Letzte Aktualisierung
25.03.2025, 13:41 MEZ

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Beteiligte

Entstanden

  • 2009

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