Arbeitspapier
Transfers to sustain core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
International environmental agreements aiming at correcting negative externalities generated by transboundary pollution are difficult to achieve for many reasons. Important obstacles arise from asymmetry in costs and benefits, and instability may occur due to the fact that coalitions of countries may attempt to do better for themselves outside of any proposed agreement. In a static context it has already been shown that it is possible to achieve stability in the sense of the core of a co-operative game, by means of appropriately defined transfers between the countries involved. However, the transboundary pollution problems that are most important are caused by accumulated pollutants so that a dynamic analysis is required. This paper provides a transfer scheme that yields a core property in a dynamic context. The possibility of computing such transfers numerically is discussed.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 62.1998
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Externalities
International Policy Coordination and Transmission
- Thema
-
Transfontier pollution
Stock pollutant
Dynamic co-operative games
Coalitions
Core solution
Grenzüberschreitende Umweltbelastung
Umweltabkommen
Spieltheorie
Core
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Germain, Marc
Tulkens, Henry
Toint, Philippe
de Zeeuw, Aart
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
1998
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Germain, Marc
- Tulkens, Henry
- Toint, Philippe
- de Zeeuw, Aart
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 1998
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model
Control-theoretic models of feedforward in manual control
Control and game theoretic models of the environment
Control system theoretic approach to model based navigation
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
Incentives for international environmental cooperation: Theoretic models and economic instruments
Proof-theoretic versus Model-theoretic Consequence
Cooperation: game theoretic approaches : [proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute on Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches, held at SUNY, Stony Brook, New York, July 18 - 29, 1994]
A Game-Theoretic Approach For Multi-Loop Control System Design
A game-theoretic approach for multi-loop control system design
Set-theoretic approaches to the aperiodic control of linear systems
Trust and Social Control. Sources of cooperation, performance, and stability in informal value transfer systems
Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model
Control-theoretic models of feedforward in manual control
Control and game theoretic models of the environment
Control system theoretic approach to model based navigation
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
Incentives for international environmental cooperation: Theoretic models and economic instruments
Proof-theoretic versus Model-theoretic Consequence
Cooperation: game theoretic approaches : [proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute on Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches, held at SUNY, Stony Brook, New York, July 18 - 29, 1994]
A Game-Theoretic Approach For Multi-Loop Control System Design
A game-theoretic approach for multi-loop control system design
Set-theoretic approaches to the aperiodic control of linear systems
Trust and Social Control. Sources of cooperation, performance, and stability in informal value transfer systems
Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model
Control-theoretic models of feedforward in manual control
Control and game theoretic models of the environment
Control system theoretic approach to model based navigation
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
Incentives for international environmental cooperation: Theoretic models and economic instruments
Proof-theoretic versus Model-theoretic Consequence
Cooperation: game theoretic approaches : [proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute on Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches, held at SUNY, Stony Brook, New York, July 18 - 29, 1994]
A Game-Theoretic Approach For Multi-Loop Control System Design
A game-theoretic approach for multi-loop control system design
Set-theoretic approaches to the aperiodic control of linear systems