Arbeitspapier

Persuasive silence

In the market where inattentive buyers can fail to notice some feasible choices, the key role of marketing is to make buyers aware of products. However, the effective marketing strategy is often subtle since marketing tactics can make buyers cautious. This paper provides a framework to analyze an effective marketing strategy to persuade an inattentive buyer in an adverse selection environment. We investigate how an attention-grabbing marketing can 'backfire' and when it can be effective.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2012,014

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Thema
signaling game
consideration set
counter signaling
limited attention
marketing
advertising

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Suzuki, Toru
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(wo)
Jena
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Suzuki, Toru
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2012

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