Deceptive Communication: Direct Lies vs. Ignorance, Partial-Truth and Silence

Arbeitspapier

In cases of conflict of interest, people can lie directly or evade the truth. We analyse this situation theoretically and test the key behavioural predictions in a novel sender-receiver game. We find senders prefer to deceive through evasion rather than direct lying, more so when evasion is a partial-truth. This is because they do not want to deceive others nor be seen as deceptive. Receivers are sensitive to the deceptive language and more likely to act in senders' favour when these lie directly. Our findings suggest dishonesty is more prevalent and costlier than previous best estimates focusing on direct lies.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 444

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Alempaki, Despoina ; Burdea, Valeria ; Read, Daniel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
• (wo): München und Berlin
• (wann): 2023

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/282135
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ