Arbeitspapier
Persuasive silence
In the market where inattentive buyers can fail to notice some feasible choices, the key role of marketing is to make buyers aware of products. However, the effective marketing strategy is often subtle since marketing tactics can make buyers cautious. This paper provides a framework to analyze an effective marketing strategy to persuade an inattentive buyer in an adverse selection environment. We investigate how an attention-grabbing marketing can 'backfire' and when it can be effective.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2012,014
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Subject
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signaling game
consideration set
counter signaling
limited attention
marketing
advertising
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Suzuki, Toru
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (where)
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Jena
- (when)
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2012
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Suzuki, Toru
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2012