Arbeitspapier

Persuasive silence

In the market where inattentive buyers can fail to notice some feasible choices, the key role of marketing is to make buyers aware of products. However, the effective marketing strategy is often subtle since marketing tactics can make buyers cautious. This paper provides a framework to analyze an effective marketing strategy to persuade an inattentive buyer in an adverse selection environment. We investigate how an attention-grabbing marketing can 'backfire' and when it can be effective.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2012,014

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Subject
signaling game
consideration set
counter signaling
limited attention
marketing
advertising

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Suzuki, Toru
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(where)
Jena
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Suzuki, Toru
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2012

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