Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency

Arbeitspapier

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise if workers do not know where other workers apply to (this affects network creation) and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider (this affects network clearing). We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not independent. Equilibria that exhibit wage dispersion is inefficient in terms of network formation. Under complete recall (firms can go back and forth between all their candidates) only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post Bertrand competition generate the maximum matching on a realized network.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3522

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory ; Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
• Thema: efficiency ; network clearing ; random bipartite network formation ; simultaneous search ; Arbeitsplatzsuchmodell ; Arbeitsnachfrage ; Netzwerk ; Lohn ; Matching ; Arbeitsmarkt ; Markteffizienz ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gautier, Pieter A. ; Holzner, Christian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49511
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ