Simultaneous search with heterogeneous firms and ex post competition

Arbeitspapier

We study a search model where workers can send multiple applications to high and low productivity firms. Firms that compete for the same candidate can increase their wage offers as often as they like. We show that there is a unique equilibrium where workers mix between sending both applications to the high and both to the low productivity sector. Efficiency requires however that they apply to both sectors because then the coordination frictions are lowest. For many configurations, the equilibrium outcomes are the same under directed and random search. Allowing for free entry creates a second source of inefficiency.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2056

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity ; Labor Demand ; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
• Thema: directed search ; efficiency ; coordination frictions ; Arbeitsplatzsuchmodell ; Arbeitsuche ; Produktivität ; Matching ; Wirtschaftsmodell

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gautier, Pieter A. ; Wolthoff, Ronald P.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33635
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ