Arbeitspapier

Search Engine Competition

This paper studies a model of search engine competition with endogenous obfuscation. Platforms may differ in the quality of their search algorithms. I study the impact of this heterogeneity in consumer surplus, seller profits and platform revenue. I show that the dominant platform will typically induce higher prices but that consumers may benefit from asymmetries. I also show that enabling sellers to price-discriminate across platforms is pro-competitive. I then embed the static model in a dynamic setup, whereby past market shares lead to a better search algorithm. The dynamic consideration is pro-competitive but initial asymmetries are persistent.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10856

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Advertising
Thema
search engine
platform competition
consumer search

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Garcia, Daniel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2023

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Garcia, Daniel
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2023

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