Konferenzbeitrag
Advantageous Leadership in Public Good Provision: The Case of an Endogenous Contribution Technology
From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general) will be lower in a leader-follower game than in a simultaneous Nash game so that strategic leadership is disadvantageous for climate policy. We show that this need no longer be true when the leading country has the option to employ a technology by which it can reduce its abatement costs and thus improve the productivity of its contribution technology.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Environmental Economics, Natural Resources and Climate Change II ; No. C17-V3
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Buchholz, Wolfgang
Eichenseer, Michael
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (where)
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Kiel, Hamburg
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Buchholz, Wolfgang
- Eichenseer, Michael
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 2017