Arbeitspapier

Advantageous Leadership in Public Good Provision: The Case of an Endogenous Contribution Technology

From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general) will be lower in a leader-follower game than in a simultaneous Nash game so that strategic leadership is disadvantageous for climate policy. We show that this need no longer be true when the leading country has the option to employ a technology by which it can reduce its abatement costs and thus improve the productivity of its contribution technology. Our general result is illustrated by an example with Cobb-Douglas preferences and, finally, an empirical application to global climate policy is briefly discussed.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6352

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
Subject
public goods
leadership
choice of technology
climate policy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Buchholz, Wolfgang
Eichenseer, Michael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Buchholz, Wolfgang
  • Eichenseer, Michael
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2017

Other Objects (12)