Arbeitspapier
Advantageous Leadership in Public Good Provision: The Case of an Endogenous Contribution Technology
From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general) will be lower in a leader-follower game than in a simultaneous Nash game so that strategic leadership is disadvantageous for climate policy. We show that this need no longer be true when the leading country has the option to employ a technology by which it can reduce its abatement costs and thus improve the productivity of its contribution technology. Our general result is illustrated by an example with Cobb-Douglas preferences and, finally, an empirical application to global climate policy is briefly discussed.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6352
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
- Subject
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public goods
leadership
choice of technology
climate policy
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Buchholz, Wolfgang
Eichenseer, Michael
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Buchholz, Wolfgang
- Eichenseer, Michael
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2017
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Advantageous Leadership in Public Good Provision: The Case of an Endogenous Contribution Technology
Successful Leadership in Global Public Good Provision: Incorporating Behavioural Approaches
Social Norms and Private Provision of Public Goods: Endogenous Peer Groups
Essays on the conditional contribution mechanism for public good provision
The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for the Provision of Public Goods
Essays on the Conditional Contribution Mechanism for Public Good Provision
The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for the Provision of Public Goods
Endogenous move structure and voluntary provision of public goods: Theory and experiment
Endogenous move structure and voluntary provision of public goods: Theory and experiments
Essays on Public Good Provision : Fair Contribution Rules and Institution Formation
Endogenous leadership: selection and influence