Arbeitspapier

Advantageous Leadership in Public Good Provision: The Case of an Endogenous Contribution Technology

From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general) will be lower in a leader-follower game than in a simultaneous Nash game so that strategic leadership is disadvantageous for climate policy. We show that this need no longer be true when the leading country has the option to employ a technology by which it can reduce its abatement costs and thus improve the productivity of its contribution technology. Our general result is illustrated by an example with Cobb-Douglas preferences and, finally, an empirical application to global climate policy is briefly discussed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6352

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
Thema
public goods
leadership
choice of technology
climate policy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Buchholz, Wolfgang
Eichenseer, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Buchholz, Wolfgang
  • Eichenseer, Michael
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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