Arbeitspapier
Elections and the Timing of Devaluations
This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model for an open economy, in which devaluations are delayed in the pre-election period so as to increase the electoral chances of the party in office. By concentrating on closed economies, previous political cycle models had overlooked the influence of elections on the behavior of exchange rates. Voter uncertainty is introduced in two different dimensions. Not only are voters uncertain regarding the competency of the incumbent, but tey also ignore the degree to which the incumbent is opportunistic.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 396
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Abwertung
Wahl
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Unvollkommene Information
Offene Volkswirtschaft
Schätzung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Stein, Ernesto H.
Streb, Jorge M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the Chief Economist
- (wo)
-
Washington, DC
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Stein, Ernesto H.
- Streb, Jorge M.
- Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the Chief Economist
Entstanden
- 1999
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