Elections and government efficiency

Arbeitspapier

Politicians are expected to influence policy outcomes in a way to gain electoral advantage. There is, however, a pending question whether efficiency in the provision of public goods and services is affected by strategic behavior. I examine how electoral cycles influence local government efficiency by using OLS fixed effects, event study, and instrumental variable estimations in a large balanced panel of around 2,000 municipalities in the German state of Bavaria. Cost efficiency is estimated by employing a fixed effects semi-parametric stochastic frontier analysis. The results show that electoral cycles increase government efficiency in election and pre-election years by around 0.75- 0.85 %. The effect is larger when executive and council electoral cycles coincide, and when incumbent mayors run for office again. My findings suggest an efficiencyenhancing effect of elections at given institutional conditions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ifo Working Paper ; No. 363

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models ; Single Equation Models: Single Variables: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Public Goods ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General ; State and Local Budget and Expenditures ; General Regional Economics: Econometric and Input-Output Models; Other Models ; Regional Government Analysis: General
• Thema: Electoral cycle ; efficiency ; local government ; stochastic frontier analysis (sfa) ; panel data ; event study ; instrumental variables

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dorn, Florian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/248561
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ