Financial constraints and moral hazard: The case of franchising

Arbeitspapier

Financial constraints are an important impediment to the growth of small businesses. We study theoretically and empirically how the financial constraints of agents affect their decisions to exert effort, and, hence the organizational decisions and growth of principals, in the context of franchising. We find that a 30 percent decrease in average collateralizable housing wealth in a region delays chains' entry into franchising by 0.28 years on average, 9 percent of the average waiting time, and slows their growth by around 10 percent, leading to a 10 percent reduction in franchised chain employment.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-113-7
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 114

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: R&D ; contracting ; incentives ; principal-agent ; empirical ; collateralizable housing wealth ; entry ; growth

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fan, Ying ; Kühn, Kai-Uwe ; Lafontaine, Francine
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (wo): Düsseldorf
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87716
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ