Arbeitspapier

Separating the hawks from the doves

Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the same game. These findings support a distinctive prediction of evolutionary game theory.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 658

Classification
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Subject
evolutionary dynamics
Hawk-Dove game
game theory
laboratory experiment
continuous time game
Dynamisches Spiel
Konflikt
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Henwood, Keith
Friedman, Daniel
Oprea, Ryan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of California, Economics Department
(where)
Santa Cruz, CA
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Henwood, Keith
  • Friedman, Daniel
  • Oprea, Ryan
  • University of California, Economics Department

Time of origin

  • 2009

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