Why Are There Strikes?

Arbeitspapier

Strikes, just as other types of conflict, used to be difficult to explain from an economic perspective. Initially, it was thought that they were a result of mistakes or irrationality. Then, during the 1980s an explosion of research brought asymmetric information to prominence as a significant cause of strikes. After reviewing such long-standing potential explanations, we go over some more recent ones. When a strike changes the future strategic positions of unions relative to firms compared to a bargain, then a strike can ensue; significantly, the more important the future is considered to be (i.e., the higher is the discount factor), the more likely a strike is. In a new model we show how solidarity based on identification with the union can lead to strikes. Additionally, power asymmetries, reputation-building, and internal union politics can account for strikes within a rational-choice, economic perspective.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8620

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining ; Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: unions ; strikes ; dispute resolution ; bargaining

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Nok Chun, Kyung ; Schaller, Zachary ; Skaperdas, Stergios
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2020

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/226322
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET