Arbeitspapier

Why Are There Strikes?

Strikes, just as other types of conflict, used to be difficult to explain from an economic perspective. Initially, it was thought that they were a result of mistakes or irrationality. Then, during the 1980s an explosion of research brought asymmetric information to prominence as a significant cause of strikes. After reviewing such long-standing potential explanations, we go over some more recent ones. When a strike changes the future strategic positions of unions relative to firms compared to a bargain, then a strike can ensue; significantly, the more important the future is considered to be (i.e., the higher is the discount factor), the more likely a strike is. In a new model we show how solidarity based on identification with the union can lead to strikes. Additionally, power asymmetries, reputation-building, and internal union politics can account for strikes within a rational-choice, economic perspective.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8620

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Thema
unions
strikes
dispute resolution
bargaining

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Nok Chun, Kyung
Schaller, Zachary
Skaperdas, Stergios
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Nok Chun, Kyung
  • Schaller, Zachary
  • Skaperdas, Stergios
  • Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2020

Ähnliche Objekte (12)