Arbeitspapier
Evolutionary determinants of war
This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We find that players' evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2013-302
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Subject
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Conflict
Contest
Endogenous fighting
Balance of power
Evolutionary stability
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Konrad, Kai A.
Morath, Florian
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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2013
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Morath, Florian
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Time of origin
- 2013
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