Arbeitspapier
Evolutionary determinants of war
This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We find that players' evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2013-302
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Thema
-
Conflict
Contest
Endogenous fighting
Balance of power
Evolutionary stability
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Konrad, Kai A.
Morath, Florian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Morath, Florian
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2013
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