Bureaucratic Frictions and Innovation Procurement

Arbeitspapier

Is work overload a friction to public agencies? Using data on R&D procurements, patents, and contracting units from a US federal agency, we investigate how officer workload impacts innovation procurement outcomes. Unanticipated retirement shifts provide an exogenous source of variation that we exploit as an instrument for workload. When workload declines, we find a significant increase in patent rates. One additional officer leads to a 28 percent increase in the probability that a contract will generate a patent. Our findings suggest that officers burdened with excessive workloads may not provide adequate guidance to R&D suppliers when it is most needed.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10775

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement ; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
• Thema: workload ; procurement ; bureaucrats ; R&D ; patents ; instrumental variable

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Giuffrida, Leonardo M. ; Raiteri, Emilio
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2023

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/282463
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ