Tying lending and underwriting : scope economies, incentives, and reputation [[Elektronische Ressource]]
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Edition
-
Version October 2006
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2006,27
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Keyword
-
Tying
Investment Banking
Universal Banking
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Frankfurt am Main
- (who)
-
Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- (when)
-
2006
- Creator
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-38017
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
25.03.2025, 1:50 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Laux, Christian
- Walz, Uwe
- Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Time of origin
- 2006
Other Objects (12)
Tying lending and underwriting: Scope economies, incentives, and reputation
Cross-selling lending and underwriting : scope economies and incentives
Managers as administrators: reputation and incentives
Managers as administrators: reputation and incentives
The scope of cooperation: values and incentives
Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority
Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Firm Reputation and Incentives to Milk Pending Patents
Reputation in multi agent systems and the incentives to provide feedback
Why volunteer? Evidence on the role of altruism, reputation, and incentives
Reputation in multi agent systems and the incentives to provide feedback
Tying lending and underwriting: Scope economies, incentives, and reputation
Cross-selling lending and underwriting : scope economies and incentives
Managers as administrators: reputation and incentives
Managers as administrators: reputation and incentives
The scope of cooperation: values and incentives
Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority
Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Firm Reputation and Incentives to Milk Pending Patents
Reputation in multi agent systems and the incentives to provide feedback
Why volunteer? Evidence on the role of altruism, reputation, and incentives
Reputation in multi agent systems and the incentives to provide feedback
Tying lending and underwriting: Scope economies, incentives, and reputation
Cross-selling lending and underwriting : scope economies and incentives
Managers as administrators: reputation and incentives
Managers as administrators: reputation and incentives
The scope of cooperation: values and incentives
Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority
Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Firm Reputation and Incentives to Milk Pending Patents
Reputation in multi agent systems and the incentives to provide feedback
Why volunteer? Evidence on the role of altruism, reputation, and incentives