Arbeitspapier
Firm Reputation and Incentives to Milk Pending Patents
In this paper we develop a theory of patenting in which a firm preserves its reputation to only apply for a patent whenever a truly patentable idea has been generated. Firms have a short-run incentive to deviate and receive additional rents from unworthy pending patents, as well as potential rents from PTO mistakes in granting patents. We provide conditions for reputation to be preserved in equilibrium and analyze which market environments are favorable for such an equilibrium to exist. In particular, we analyze the merits of different patent systems.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4355
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- Thema
-
pending patents
reputation
patent quality
patent office policy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Koenen, Johannes
Peitz, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:47 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Koenen, Johannes
- Peitz, Martin
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2013
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