Arbeitspapier

The transparency of the banking industry and the efficiency of information-based bank runs

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of banks and the fragility of the banking system.We show that information-based bank runs may be inefficient because the deposit contract designed to provide liquidity induces depositors to have excessive incentives to withdraw.An improvement in transparency of a bank may reduce depositor welfare through increasing the chance of an inefficient contagious bank run on other banks.A deposit insurance system in which some depositors are fully insured and the others are partially insured can ameliorate this inefficiency.Under such a system, bank runs can serve as an efficient mechanism for disciplining banks.We also consider bank managers' control over the timing of information disclosure, and find that they may lack the incentive to reveal information about their banks.

ISBN
952-462-241-6
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 24/2005

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
bank run
contagion
transparency
market discipline
deposit insurance

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Chen, Yehning
Hasan, Iftekhar
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Chen, Yehning
  • Hasan, Iftekhar
  • Bank of Finland

Entstanden

  • 2005

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