Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection

Arbeitspapier

Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents' awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is robust to unawareness of actions if and only if it is not weakly dominated. Finally, we discuss the relationship between standard Bayesian games and Bayesian games with unawareness.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 12-9

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Noncooperative Games ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Unawareness ; Awareness ; Type-space ; Incomplete information ; Bayesian ; games ; Equilibrium ; Perfection ; Undominated equilibrium ; Weak dominance ; Inattention

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Meier, Martin ; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of California, Department of Economics
• (where): Davis, CA
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58374