Arbeitspapier
Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection
Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents' awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is robust to unawareness of actions if and only if it is not weakly dominated. Finally, we discuss the relationship between standard Bayesian games and Bayesian games with unawareness.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 12-9
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Noncooperative Games
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Unawareness
Awareness
Type-space
Incomplete information
Bayesian
games
Equilibrium
Perfection
Undominated equilibrium
Weak dominance
Inattention
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Meier, Martin
Schipper, Burkhard C.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of California, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Davis, CA
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Meier, Martin
- Schipper, Burkhard C.
- University of California, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2012
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