Artikel
Relevance versus reliability of accounting information with unlimited and limited commitment
We consider a two-period LEN-type agency problem. The principal needs to implement one out of two accounting systems. One emphasizes relevance, the other reliability. Both systems produce identical inter-temporally correlated signals. The relevant system reports an accounting signal in the period in which it is produced. The reliable system reports a more precise signal, but with a one period delay. Accounting information is contractible only if it is reported within the two-period horizon of the game. Accordingly, accounting information produced in the second period becomes uncontractible with the reliable system in place. Non-accounting information needs to be used for contracting to provide any second period incentives at all.Wederive optimal compensation contracts in a full and in a limited commitment setting. With full commitment, the reliable system trades-offmore precise first and less precise second-period contractible information, as compared to the relevant system. If the reduction of noise in the accounting signals is strong and the distortion in the non-accounting measure is weak, the reliable system is preferred. With limited commitment we identify a similar trade-off if intertemporal correlation of the signals is negative. If it is positive, this tradeoff might reverse: The reliable system is possibly preferred if noise reduction is small and the non-accounting measure is heavily distorted. Noisiness in performance measures then serves as a commitment device. It reduces otherwise overly high powered incentives and thus benefits the principal.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Business Research ; ISSN: 2198-2627 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 189-213 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Klassifikation
-
Management
- Thema
-
Accounting information
Agency-problem
Limited commitment
Timeliness
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schöndube-Pirchegger, Barbara
Schöndube, Jens Robert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Springer
- (wo)
-
Heidelberg
- (wann)
-
2017
- DOI
-
doi:10.1007/s40685-017-0050-2
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Schöndube-Pirchegger, Barbara
- Schöndube, Jens Robert
- Springer
Entstanden
- 2017