Arbeitspapier
Lender of last resort and bank closure policy
During the last decades a consensus has emerged that it is impossible to disentangle liquidity shocks from solvency shocks. As a consequence the classical lender of last resort rules, as defined by Thornton and Bagehot, based on lending to solvent illiquid institutions appear ill-suited to this environment. We summarize here the main contributions that have developed considering this new paradigm and discuss how institutional features relating to bank closure policy influences lender of last resort and other safety net issues. We devote particular emphasis to the analysis of systemic risk and contagion in banking and the role of the lender of last resort to prevent it.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2286
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Central Banks and Their Policies
- Subject
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lender of last resort
systemic risk
contagion
bank closure
liquidity
discount window
Lender of Last Resort
Bankenaufsicht
Bankinsolvenz
Bankenliquidität
Bankenkrise
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Freixas, Xavier
Parigi, Bruno Maria
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2008
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Freixas, Xavier
- Parigi, Bruno Maria
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2008