Arbeitspapier
A Note on the Shapley Value for Characteristic Functions on Bipartitions
We consider a cooperative game with a bipartition that indicates which players are participating. This paper provides an analytical solution for the Shapley value when the worth of a coalition only depends on the number of participating coalition players. The computational complexity grows linearly in the number of players, which contrasts with the usual exponential increase. Our result remains true when we introduce (i) randomization of the bipartition, and (ii) randomly draw a characteristic function.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-124/2
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Subject
-
Shapley value
computational complexity
bipartition
Shapley-Wert
Kooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Muns, Sander
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Muns, Sander
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2011
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