Inefficiency and self-determination: Simulation-based evidence from Meiji Japan

Arbeitspapier

Does the exercise of the right of self-determination lead to inefficiency? This paper considers a set of centrally planned municipal mergers during the Meiji period, with data from Gifu prefecture. The observed merger pattern can be explained as a social optimum based on a very simple individual utility function. If individual villages had been allowed to choose their merger partners, counterfactual simulations show that the core is always non-empty, but core partitions contain about 80% more (postmerger) municipalities than the social optimum. Simulations are possible because core partitions can be calculated using repeated application of a mixed integer program.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper ; No. 1050

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling ; Cooperative Games ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; International Law ; Regional and Urban History: Asia including Middle East
• Thema: Municipal mergers ; one-sided matching ; moment inequalities ; mixed integer programming ; Gifu

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Weese, Eric ; Hayashi, Masayoshi ; Nishikawa, Masashi
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Yale University, Economic Growth Center
• (wo): New Haven, CT
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147534
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ