Inefficiency and self-determination: Simulation-based evidence from Meiji Japan

Arbeitspapier

Does the exercise of the right of self-determination lead to inefficiency? This paper considers a set of centrally planned municipal mergers during the Meiji period, with data from Gifu prefecture. The observed merger pattern can be explained as a social optimum based on a very simple individual utility function. If individual villages had been allowed to choose their merger partners, counterfactual simulations show that the core is always non-empty, but core partitions contain about 80% more (postmerger) municipalities than the social optimum. Simulations are possible because core partitions can be calculated using repeated application of a mixed integer program.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper ; No. 1050

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling ; Cooperative Games ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; International Law ; Regional and Urban History: Asia including Middle East
• Subject: Municipal mergers ; one-sided matching ; moment inequalities ; mixed integer programming ; Gifu

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Weese, Eric ; Hayashi, Masayoshi ; Nishikawa, Masashi
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Yale University, Economic Growth Center
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147534
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET