Arbeitspapier
Inefficiency and self-determination: Simulation-based evidence from Meiji Japan
Does the exercise of the right of self-determination lead to inefficiency? This paper considers a set of centrally planned municipal mergers during the Meiji period, with data from Gifu prefecture. The observed merger pattern can be explained as a social optimum based on a very simple individual utility function. If individual villages had been allowed to choose their merger partners, counterfactual simulations show that the core is always non-empty, but core partitions contain about 80% more (postmerger) municipalities than the social optimum. Simulations are possible because core partitions can be calculated using repeated application of a mixed integer program.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper ; No. 1050
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
Cooperative Games
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
International Law
Regional and Urban History: Asia including Middle East
- Subject
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Municipal mergers
one-sided matching
moment inequalities
mixed integer programming
Gifu
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Weese, Eric
Hayashi, Masayoshi
Nishikawa, Masashi
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Yale University, Economic Growth Center
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Weese, Eric
- Hayashi, Masayoshi
- Nishikawa, Masashi
- Yale University, Economic Growth Center
Time of origin
- 2015