Arbeitspapier

Attention competition

I present a game-theoretic model where economic competition and attention competition are interdependent. On the one hand the effort to attract consumer attention depends on the value of attention to the firm which depends on the grade of price competition among all perceived firms. On the other hand attracting attention involves costs which must be covered by the earnings from competition. It is the task of this paper to clarify the consequences of such an interdependence between attention competition and economic competition for prices, attention effort and market structure as determined by the strategic equilibrium. Under limited attention the market as perceived by consumers and not the effective market is relevant to the firms which implies that prices also reflect the scarcity of attention. Less attentive consumers lead to higher prices but at the same time getting attention is more valuable which intensifies the competition for attention and leads to higher attention costs. I show that if attention competition is relatively inelastic or the commodities are strong substitutes then the gains from consumer inattention outweigh the costs of attracting attention which leads to higher profits and larger effective markets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 28

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Noncooperative Games
Thema
Limited Attention
Competition
Pricing
Strategic equilibrium
Konsumentenverhalten
Preiswettbewerb
Unvollkommener Wettbewerb
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hefti, Andreas M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2011

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-51532
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hefti, Andreas M.
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2011

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