Arbeitspapier

Communication & competition

Charness and Dufwenberg (American Economic Review, June 2011, 1211-1237) have recently demonstrated that cheap-talk communication raises efficiency in bilateral contracting situations with adverse selection. We replicate their finding and check its robustness by introducing competition between agents. We find that communication and competition act as substitutes: communication raises efficiency in the absence of competition but lowers efficiency with competition, and competition raises efficiency without communication but lowers efficiency with communication. We briefly review some behavioral theories that have been proposed in this context and show that each can explain some but not all features of the observed data patterns. Our findings highlight the fragility of cheap-talk communication and may serve as a guide to refine existing behavioral theories.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 74

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
cheap talk
adverse selection
competition
guilt aversion
lie aversion
inequality aversion
reciprocity
Asymmetrische Information
Kommunikation
Adverse Selektion
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Verhaltensökonomik
Spieltheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goeree, Jacob K.
Zhang, Jingjing
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2012

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-62416
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Goeree, Jacob K.
  • Zhang, Jingjing
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2012

Ähnliche Objekte (12)