Arbeitspapier

Elite capture, political voice and exclusion from aid: an experimental study

We experimentally study the influence of local information conditions on elite capture and social exclusion in community-based development schemes with heterogeneous groups. Not only information on the distribution of aid resources through community-based schemes, but also information on who makes use of an available punishment mechanism through majority voting may be important. The main results are the following. First, many rich community representatives try to satisfy a political majority who would then abstain from using the punishment mechanism, and exclude those community members whose approval is then not required. The frequency of this exclusion strategy is highest with private information on the distribution and public voting. Second, when voting is public, responders are more reluctant to make use of the punishment mechanism, and representatives who follow the exclusion strategy are more inclined to exclude the poorest responder. Third, punishment is largely ineffective as it induces rich representatives to capture all economic resources. Fourth, if a poor agent takes the representative's role, punishment rates drop, efficiency increases, and final distributions become more equal.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3673

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
Distribution of aid
inequality
social exclusion
laboratory experiment
Entwicklungshilfe
Verteilungspolitik
Bürgerbeteiligung
Public Choice
Soziale Isolation
Soziale Ungleichheit
Interessenpolitik
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
D'Exelle, Ben
Riedl, Arno
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2008

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008091734
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • D'Exelle, Ben
  • Riedl, Arno
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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