Arbeitspapier
Elite capture, political voice and exclusion from aid: an experimental study
We experimentally study the influence of local information conditions on elite capture and social exclusion in community-based development schemes with heterogeneous groups. Not only information on the distribution of aid resources through community-based schemes, but also information on who makes use of an available punishment mechanism through majority voting may be important. The main results are the following. First, many rich community representatives try to satisfy a political majority who would then abstain from using the punishment mechanism, and exclude those community members whose approval is then not required. The frequency of this exclusion strategy is highest with private information on the distribution and public voting. Second, when voting is public, responders are more reluctant to make use of the punishment mechanism, and representatives who follow the exclusion strategy are more inclined to exclude the poorest responder. Third, punishment is largely ineffective as it induces rich representatives to capture all economic resources. Fourth, if a poor agent takes the representative's role, punishment rates drop, efficiency increases, and final distributions become more equal.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2400
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Subject
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Distribution of aid
inequality
social exclusion
laboratory experiment
Entwicklungshilfe
Verteilungspolitik
Bürgerbeteiligung
Public Choice
Soziale Isolation
Soziale Ungleichheit
Interessenpolitik
Test
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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D'Exelle, Ben
Riedl, Arno
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- D'Exelle, Ben
- Riedl, Arno
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2008