Arbeitspapier

Threat and punishment in public good experiments

Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short run. Could the introduction of pre-play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial impact on cooperation, while not incurring the cost associated with actual punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to punish others based on their contribution levels to a public good. After observing others' actual contributions, they choose their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is improved, but only in the long run. However, the possibility of sanctioning differences between threatened and actual punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the absence of threats.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5206

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Thema
threats
cheap talk
sanctions
public good
experiment
Öffentliches Gut
Gefangenendilemma
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Strafe
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Masclet, David
Noussair, Charles N.
Villeval, Marie-Claire
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Masclet, David
  • Noussair, Charles N.
  • Villeval, Marie-Claire
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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