Reform Paths and Institutional Resilience

Konferenzbeitrag

Broadly speaking, institutional reformers decide about the sequencing of types of reforms, either addressing institutional quality or macroeconomic stability. This paper develops a dynamic population game, in which agents play a simple anonymous-exchange game of cooperating or defecting. Agents switch to the strategy with higher expected payoff. Reformers can affect the payoff structure of the stage game in order to maximize the number of cooperators in the population by either enacting legal reform (rule of law) or focusing on the macro outlook of the economy facilitating cooperation. Reform is cumulative and starts from initial conditions. Reform effort per period of time is capped. On the basis of the theoretical model the paper makes predictions under which conditions which types of reforms should be enacted first and under which conditions reform will not be successful. In addition, the notion of institutional resilience is introduced as a minimum threshold of legal quality, which allows the population to better withstand exogenous shocks.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Capitalist Systems: Political Economy

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Buchen, Clemens
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
• (wo): Kiel, Hamburg
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/242422
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 2025-03-10T11:45:16+0100