Artikel

Institutional reform paths

This paper develops a dynamic population game in which agents play a simple anonymous‐exchange game of cooperating or defecting. Agents switch to the strategy with a higher expected payoff. Reformers can affect the payoff structure of the stage game to maximize the number of cooperators in the population by either enacting legal reform (institutional quality of contract law) or focusing on the macro outlook of the economy. Based on the theoretical model, the paper predicts which types the reformer should enact first and under which conditions reform will not be successful.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Economics & Politics ; ISSN: 1468-0343 ; Volume: 35 ; Year: 2023 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1099-1121 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
macroeconomic political economy
microfoundations of political economy
property rights
reform/stabilization
social choice

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Buchen, Clemens
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley
(where)
Hoboken, NJ
(when)
2023

DOI
doi:10.1111/ecpo.12252
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Buchen, Clemens
  • Wiley

Time of origin

  • 2023

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