Arbeitspapier

Political Entrenchment and GDP Misreporting

By examining discrepancies between officially reported GDP growth figures and the actual economic growth implied by satellite-based night time light (NTL) density, we investigate whether democracies manipulate officially reported GDP figures, and if so, whether such manipulation pays political dividends. We find that the over-reporting of growth rates does indeed precede increases in popular support, with around a 1% over-statement associated with a 0.5% increase in voter intentions for the incumbent. These results are robust to allowing the elasticity of official GDP statistics to NTL to be country specific, as well as accounting for the quality of governance, and checks and balances on executive power.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2019-02

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Institutions and Growth
Subject
Manipulation
political entrenchment
electoral cycles
trust
popular support
GDP
night lights

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Chan, Ho Fai
Frey, Bruno S.
Skali, Ahmed
Torgler, Benno
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
(where)
Zürich
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Chan, Ho Fai
  • Frey, Bruno S.
  • Skali, Ahmed
  • Torgler, Benno
  • Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Time of origin

  • 2019

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