Arbeitspapier

Providing global public goods: Electoral delegation and cooperation

This paper experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing global public goods shared by several groups. Each group elects a delegate who can freely decide on each group member’s contribution (including the contribution of herself) to the global public good. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by the theory – quite to the opposite, other-regarding preferences and a re-election incentives guarantee that delegates assign equal contributions for all group members. Since the source of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of global public goods provision together with other-regarding preferences, we use the term Pinefficiency to describe our finding.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2014-36

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Public Goods
Thema
Global Public Goods
Delegation
Cooperation
Experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kocher, Martin G.
Tan, Fangfang
Yu, Jing
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
München
(wann)
2014

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.21163
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-21163-9
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kocher, Martin G.
  • Tan, Fangfang
  • Yu, Jing
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2014

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