Arbeitspapier

Providing Public Goods Without Strong Sanctioning Institutions

This paper proposes a simple mechanism aimed to establish positive contributions to public goods in the absence of powerful institutions to sanction free-riders. The idea of the mechanism is to require players to commit to the public good by paying a deposit prior to the contribution stage. If all players commit in this way, those players who do not contribute their share to the public good forfeit their deposit. If there is no universal commitment, all deposits are refunded and the standard game is played. Given deposits are sufficiently high, prior commitment and full ex post contributions are part of a strict subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the resulting game. As the mechanism obviates the need for any ex post prosecution of free-riders, it is particularly suited for situations where players do not submit to a common authority as in the case of international agreements.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 194

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Thema
public goods
cooperation
institutions
Climate-Change Treaties

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gerber, Anke
Wichardt, Philipp C.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2007

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13358
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13358-7
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gerber, Anke
  • Wichardt, Philipp C.
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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