Arbeitspapier
Local Interaction in Tax Evasion
We study a model of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax only finances the provision of public goods. Deciding on reported income, each individual takes into account that the less he reports, the higher is his private consumption but the lower is his moral satisfaction. The latter depends on his own current report and average previous reports of his neighbors. Under quite general assumptions, the steady state reported income is symmetric and the process converges to the steady state.
- ISBN
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978-615-5024-34-4
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2011/4
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Subject
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tax evasion
steady state
asymptotic stability
symmetrization
networks
monotone maps
Steuervermeidung
Modellierung
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Garay, Barnabás M.
Simonovits, András
Tóth, János
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
- (where)
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Budapest
- (when)
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2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Garay, Barnabás M.
- Simonovits, András
- Tóth, János
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2011
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