Arbeitspapier
A Sequential Entry Model with Strategic Use of Excess Capacity
A model of sequential entry with Leontief costs is studied in which demand is iso-elastic. Some or all firms may hold excess capacity in the perfect equilibrium to the entry game. Firms with a first mover advantage trade off the positioning value of a large investment in capacity, leading to a large market share, against the possible costs of bearing the burden of entry deterrence through holding excess capacity in equilibrium.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 835
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Barham, Brad
Ware, Roger
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Kingston (Ontario)
- (when)
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1991
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Barham, Brad
- Ware, Roger
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1991
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