Arbeitspapier
A "tragedy of the clubs": Excess entry in exclusive coalitions
We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the "tragedy of the clubs". The tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 58.1999
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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Clubs
Coalition formation
Multiperson bargaining
Clubtheorie
Koalition
Spieltheorie
Wirtschaftliche Effizienz
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Manzini, Paola
Mariotti, Marco
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
-
1999
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Manzini, Paola
- Mariotti, Marco
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 1999
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