Arbeitspapier
Competition for firms in an oligopolistic industry: do firms or countries have to pay?
We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of different size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms with the existence of location rents that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium where firms are dispersed. As economic integration proceeds, equilibrium taxes decline, switching from positive to negative levels, and then rise as trade costs fall even further. A range of trade costs is identified where economic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfare in the large country.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1976
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Economic Integration
Multinational Firms; International Business
- Thema
-
Direktinvestition
Steuerwettbewerb
Subvention
Standortwettbewerb
Oligopol
Wirtschaftsintegration
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Zwei-Länder-Modell
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Haufler, Andreas
Wooton, Ian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Haufler, Andreas
- Wooton, Ian
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2007