Arbeitspapier
Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes
Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes. This paper uses a two-party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the parties campaign decisions. Alternations of power emerge naturally, even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2004-12
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
Election
campaign platforms
agenda setting
cost of ruling
Condorcet
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Holler, Manfred
Skott, Peter
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Amherst, MA
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Holler, Manfred
- Skott, Peter
- University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2004