Wage bargaining, job loss fears and offshoring

Arbeitspapier

In this paper I present a simple theoretical model where firms and trade unions negotiate over wages. Firms have the possibility to offshore parts of the ir production and trade union members have a disutility from individual job loss fears. I show that higher job loss fears result in lower wages. As a Nash bargaining result, firms can use potential but non realized offshoring as a threat to enforce lower wages. Using a large German household survey, I can show evidence that increasing potential offshoring lowers wages through high job loss fears.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 174

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Trade and Labor Market Interactions ; Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
• Thema: offshoring ; wage bargaining ; job loss fears

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Riedl, Maximilian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
• (wo): Göttingen
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87711
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ