Artikel
Incentive provision and coordination as market functions
The market has both a coordination function and an incentive function. The first theorem of welfare economics is all about coordination; the principal-agent model is all about incentives. What is the relative importance of the market in carrying out these two functions? While there has been a shift in economic theory in the past thirty years from emphasizing the coordination role to emphasizing the incentive role, it is not clear whether this reflects a new and deeper understanding of the market. Understanding the market's functions, in real economies, may be key for understanding the degree to which redistribution in them is feasible.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research ; ISSN: 2510-5027 ; Volume: 43 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 6-16 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Labor Economics: General
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Distribution: General
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
- Thema
-
Anreizsystem
Markttheorie
Beruf
Lohn
Gleichgewichtstheorie
Umverteilung
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Roemer, John E.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Springer
- (wo)
-
Heidelberg
- (wann)
-
2010
- DOI
-
doi:10.1007/s12651-010-0027-5
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Roemer, John E.
- Springer
Entstanden
- 2010
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