Hochschulschrift
Incentive provision with multiple tasks and multiple agents
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Köln, Universität zu Köln, Diss., 2014
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Kontrakttheorie
Anreiz
LEN-Modell
Unvollkommene Information
Public Private Partnership
Verhaltensökonomie
Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Köln
- (wer)
-
Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln
- (wann)
-
2014
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Schmitz, Patrick
Gürtler, Oliver
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-56531
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 14.08.2025, 10:54 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
Beteiligte
- Kusterer, David J.
- Schmitz, Patrick
- Gürtler, Oliver
- Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln
Entstanden
- 2014
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