Arbeitspapier

Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction

In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of ?rst-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 261

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Auctions
Signaling
Price Competition
Auktionstheorie
Extensives Spiel
Preiswettbewerb
Signalling
Dynamisches Gleichgewicht
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ding, Wei
Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2009

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13291
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13291-9
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ding, Wei
  • Jeitschko, Thomas D.
  • Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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