Arbeitspapier
Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction
In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of ?rst-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 261
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Auctions
Signaling
Price Competition
Auktionstheorie
Extensives Spiel
Preiswettbewerb
Signalling
Dynamisches Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Ding, Wei
Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
-
München
- (when)
-
2009
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13291
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13291-9
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ding, Wei
- Jeitschko, Thomas D.
- Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2009