Limited capacity in project selection: Competition through evidence production

Arbeitspapier

An organization must decide which proposals to fund. In evaluating the proposals, the organization may rely on those applying for funding to produce evidence about the merits of their own proposals. We consider the role of a capacity constraint preventing the organization from funding all projects. Agents produce more (Blackwell) informative evidence about the merits of their proposals when there are capacity constraints. In a two agent model, we fully characterize the equilibrium under unlimited and limited capacity. Unless the prior strongly favors accepting both proposals, the funding organization is better off when its capacity is limited.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1343

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
• Thema: strategic search ; evidence production ; persuasion ; lobbying ; all-pay auction ; Bayesian persuasion

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Boleslavsky, Raphael ; Cotton, Christopher
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Queen's University, Department of Economics
• (wo): Kingston (Ontario)
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122033
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ